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THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY LEGISLATION
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION
STATUTES: ARE THE CALIFORNIA COURTS ESTABLISHING A
RELIGION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Everyday for the last three years-his whole life-he had two loving,
involved parents. Then he only had one. Both of his parents desperately
wanted to be a part of his life, but the law dictated that he could only have
one. This is Joshua's story.
Pat and Sydney, after a seven-year relationship, decided to have a child
together. Because they were physically unable to have a biological child,
they chose artificial insemination as the next best option. Pat underwent the
procedure and nine months later gave birth to a son, Zachary. Solidifying le-
gally what the family already knew to be true, Sydney adopted Zachary and
became his second legal parent.
Like many other parents, Pat and Sydney decided to have a second
child. In order for the new baby and Zachary to be biological siblings, Pat
used sperm from the donor involved in the first procedure during the second
artificial insemination procedure. The couple had another son, Joshua, and
again Sydney began the adoption proceedings. The couple hired an attorney
to ensure that Pat retained her rights as a parent when Sydney adopted
Joshua as his second-parent.' Pat and Sydney both signed an Independent
Adoption Placement Agreement with an addendum, which gave Sydney le-
gal parental rights with respect to Joshua without taking away Pat's parental
rights.
Before the adoption of Joshua was finalized Pat and Sydney broke up.
Despite Pat's obvious intentions that Sydney be Joshua's second-parent-as
evidenced by Sydney's adoption of their first child and by Pat's signature on
Joshua's adoption agreement-Pat prohibited the execution of the adoption.
She even refused to allow Sydney visitation or custody of baby Joshua. Pat
could exercise this authority because she was Joshua's only current legal
1. Pursuant to CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617 (West 2000), a legal parent relinquishes all rights
of care, custody, and control of the child upon adoption. The only exception is found in CAL.
FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 2000) for stepparent adoptions, see infra Part II, where the legal
parent retains rights to the child. Because Sydney is not Pat's spouse, as defined in CAL. FAM.
CODE § 308.5 (West 2000), this exception does not apply. Although CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000
(West 2002, pocket part) has been amended to include domestic partners, this section did not
become effective until after the adoption proceeding had begun. See infra Part V for a detailed
discussion of this section. Therefore, Pat and Sydney searched for another route.
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parent. Sydney, however, did not understand how the couple's subsequent
break-up could vitiate the determination-by both Pat and Sydney-that
Sydney would be Joshua's second legal parent. Joshua, too, wondered why
Sydney moved out of the house and never visited. Even Zachary was con-
fused. During their visits (which were allowed because his adoption was
completed), Sydney explained that Pat and Sydney were no longer together
and that Sydney did not have legal rights to Joshua, but Zachary did not un-
derstand why. She did not know how to explain to her son that under the law
she was considered a legal stranger to his brother.
This situation seems contrary to current notions of family, parental
rights, and the best interests of the child.' After all, Sydney had been a part
of the decision to have Joshua from the beginning. Furthermore, Sydney and
Pat were raising Joshua's brother together. At the time of conception, they
both intended for Sydney to be Joshua's second-parent. It does not seem fair
that, because the two broke up, Sydney lost all rights to be the child's parent.
It does not seem right that, although two parents usually are deemed better
than one, Joshua has been deprived of one of his parents. This situation con-
travenes what is thought to be fair for the parents and best for the child.
This Comment will explain why fairness and the child's best interests
are dismissed in these circumstances. The Comment will focus specifically
on the case of Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County,3 involving a
lesbian4 couple, to connect the three-tiered explanation of law, religion, and
morality. It will explore the religious origin behind disapproving of a sec-
ond-parent's rights when it involves a homosexual couple and approving
those same rights when it involves a heterosexual couple. It will then dem-
onstrate the immense similarity between religion and morality, which are
embedded in legislation and judicial decision-making. Part II of this Com-
ment will provide a case history of the Sharon S. decision. Part III will dis-
cuss the religious influence on this decision, specifically with regard to the
choices by the court to strictly construe the relevant adoption statutes and to
adopt the "best interests of the child" test in determining which parent will
receive legal recognition. Part IV will address the issue of whether the courts
legislate morality by implicitly endorsing a "civil religion"' consonant with
2. This story is based upon the case of Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County,
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Ct. App. 2001) (as modified on denial of rehearing, Nov. 21, 2001),
petition for review granted, 39 P.3d 512 (Cal. Jan. 29, 2002) (No. S102671). See infra Part 11
for a case history.
3. Id.
4. Because the couple in Sharon S. was a lesbian couple, this will be the term primarily
used throughout the article to refer to homosexuals.
5. MEANING AND MODERNITY: RELIGION, POLITY AND SELF 5-7, 11, 13 (Richard Madsen
et al. eds., 1970). Many authors in this book refer to Robert Bellah's essay in which he coined
the term "civil religion." Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in DAEDALUS 96, 1-21
(1967). Robert Bellah himself revisits this idea in the epilogue. Robert N. Bellah, Epilogue, in
MEANING AND MODERNITY: RELIGION, POLITY AND SELF, at 255-76 (Richard Madsen et al.
eds., 1970). See also JOIN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ch. 8 (2000).
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Judeo-Christian beliefs. Part V will discuss the most relevant piece of legis-
lature, Assembly Bill 25 enacted on January 1, 2002, and address whether it
was passed due to changing religious beliefs or despite them. Concluding
remarks focus on the influence of California on legal decisions made
throughout the nation. Should the California Supreme Court strictly construe
the adoption statutes to reinforce Judeo-Christian-based beliefs that homo-
sexuality is immoral? Consequently, other states may follow California's
reasoning, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
II. THE SHARON S. DECISION
The facts of the case mimic those in the Pat/Sydney hypothetical.6
Sharon and Annette began dating in 1989, moved to San Diego in 1990, at-
tended couples counseling to work through conflicts, and eventually decided
to have a baby together.7 Sharon gave birth to Zachary in 1996 following ar-
tificial insemination by an anonymous donor.8 The superior court approved
Annette's petition to adopt Zachary as a co-parent with Sharon, so that
Sharon would retain all of her parental rights."
The couple decided to have another child, and in 1999 Sharon gave birth
to Joshua."1 Soon thereafter Annette and Sharon began adoption proceedings
by retaining an attorney." They both signed an Independent Adoption
Placement Agreement stating that Sharon was "giv[ing] up all [her] rights of
custody, services, and earnings of [Joshua]" to Annette "for the purpose of
[an] independent adoption" and that Sharon had ninety days to revoke her
consent.1 Sharon attached an addendum to the agreement, developed by the
Department of Social Services (DSS) to facilitate these types of adoptions, 3
which stated that, regardless of the words of the agreement, she intended to
retain all of her parental rights with respect to Joshua. 4 She understood the
agreement as creating a legally recognized parent-child relationship between
6. See supra Part I.
7. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 109-10.
8. Id. at 110.
9. Id. See supra note 1. The court approved the petition despite an allegedly contrary
recommendation by the Department of Social Services. Id. The reason behind the contrary
recommendation probably had more to do with the governor of California than it did with
Annette's ability as a parent. During Governor Pete Wilson's tenure, he signed an order for-
bidding social workers with the Department of Social Services from recommending homo-
sexuals as adoptive parents. Governor Gray Davis rescinded this order on November 18,
1999. Therese Jansen, Adoption in California, at http://www.lesbianworlds.com/ arti-
cles/family 111999.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
10. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Although the agency is now called "Department of Health and Human Services," this
paper will refer to the agency as DSS, the name used by the court.
14. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
3
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Joshua and Annette, co-existent with her own. 5 Annette filed the requisite
petition to adopt Joshua as a co-parent and eight months thereafter DSS rec-
ommended to the court that the petition be granted. 6 Sharon continuously
postponed the hearing on the petition after troubles in the relationship be-
came more frequent. 7 Sharon eventually asked Annette to move out, at
which time they each retained independent counsel regarding the adoption.8
After the parties reached an agreement regarding custody of both the boys,
Annette filed a motion to establish a legal parental relationship with Joshua
followed by a motion to adopt. 9 In addition to arguing that she had a right to
adopt Joshua under estoppel and that an adoption was in Joshua's best inter-
ests, Annette argued that Sharon's consent, given in the Adoption Agree-
ment, had become irrevocable pursuant to California Family Code section
8814.5.0 Both the family court services counselor and DSS recommended
that Annette remain a part of Joshua's life; DSS requested that the court ap-
prove Annette's petition to adopt Joshua.'
Sharon responded by withdrawing her consent to the adoption, arguing
that it was obtained as a result of "fraud, undue influence and duress."2 Ad-
ditionally, she argued that this adoption would not be in Joshua's best inter-
ests, nor did it have any legal basis.23 The superior court denied Sharon's
motion to dismiss the adoption petition, indicating that the adoption petition
would be in Joshua's best interests. 4
Sharon appealed. The Fourth District Court of Appeals agreed with
Sharon's argument that Annette had no legal right to adopt Joshua and, in
fact, did not have any right to adopt Zachary. Despite the latter contention,
however, the court allowed Zachary's adoption to stand and retracted its in-
ference that all adoptions of this type were invalid.26
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5 (West 2000) states that once the legal parent has con-
sented to the adoption in writing, that parent has thirty days to revoke the consent.
21. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110-11.
22. Id. at 110.
23. Id. at 110-11.
24. Id. at 111.
25. The original opinion issued on October 25, 2001 suggested that because adoptions of
this type have no statutory basis, all existing adoptions might be invalid. San Diego's Gay,
Lesbian, Bisexual & Transgender Bar Association, at http://www.thia.org (last updated Jan.
21, 2002).
26. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115. The modified opinion issued on November 21,
2001 deleted the sentence suggesting all such adoptions are invalid and adding a sentence
stating that the court does not address the validity of existing second-parent adoptions. San
Diego's Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual & Transgender Bar Association, at http://www.thla.org (last
updated Jan. 21, 2002).
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After explaining the three methods for adopting a minor (explained be-
low), the court of appeals held that Annette' s petition to adopt Joshua had no
statutory basis.27 In a stepparent adoption, the spouse of the legal parent28 pe-
titions the court to adopt the legal parent's child(ren), with the consent of
one or both of the legal parents. 9 This procedure, disparate from the other
two methods of adoption, does not terminate the legal parent's rights in con-
nection with the child.3" Annette's alleged adoption did not qualify as a step-
parent adoption because she was not married to Sharon at the time of the
adoption.3
An agency adoption requires that the legal parents32 relinquish their pa-
rental rights to a licensed adoption agency or to DSS, such that the agency
(or DSS) has exclusive custody and control over the child until that child is
adopted.33 This option allows the legal parents to name the parent(s) with
whom the child is to be placed. Annette' s alleged adoption of Joshua did not
qualify because Sharon did not place Joshua with an agency or with DSS
with intent to relinquish her rights.34
An independent adoption follows the same basic procedure as an agency
adoption, although with this method the legal parents relinquish their rights
directly to the adoptive parents without any other agency (or DSS) joining in
the adoption petition.33 The legal parents must sign an adoption placement
agreement consenting to the adoption, and may revoke this consent within
ninety days.36 The final step requires court approval.37 Annette's alleged
adoption did not qualify as an independent adoption because Sharon did not
agree unequivocally to terminate her parental rights.38 Annette argued, how-
ever, that she successfully sought a "modified" independent adoption, al-
27. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111-12.
28. "Legal parent" refers to either a biological parent or an adoptive parent. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 8512 (West 2000).
29. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9000, 8548 (West 2000).
30. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9000, 8548 (West 2000).
31. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112. See Assemb. B. 25, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal. 2002),
allows registered domestic partners to adopt their partner's child(ren) under a stepparent
adoption procedure. This does not apply in Annette's situation because the procedure took
place before the enactment of the statute. Additionally, because Annette and Sharon are no
longer involved, Annette cannot use domestic partner registration as a way to pursue the
adoption. See infra Part V for further discussion on Assemb. B. 25, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal.
2002).
32. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8512 (West 2000), using the term "legal parents" to mean ex-
isting parents of the child.
33. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8700-8720, 8518 (West
2000).
34. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. at 112; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8700(a), 8703 (West 2000).
35. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. at 112; CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8800-8823, 8524 (West 2000).
36. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112; CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.3(b) & (c)(2) (West
2000).
37. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112; CAL. FAM. CODE§§ 8616, 8617 (West 2000).
38. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112; CAL. FAM. CoDE§§ 8617, 8819 (West 2000).
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lowed under a liberal construction of the adoption statutes. 9 This method,
commonly referred to as a "second-parent adoption," has been used routinely
by same sex couples and involves one partner adopting the child(ren)' of the
other, with the legal parent expressing an intent to retain parental rights. For
over ten years California superior courts and DSS have approved of second-
parent adoptions." DSS, recognizing that no express statutory authority ex-
isted for second-parent adoptions, developed two methods of executing
them. 2 They include modified independent adoptions (where the legal parent
allows her partner to adopt the child without relinquishing her rights) and
agency adoptions (where the legal parent relinquishes her rights to an adop-
tion agency, expressly designating herself and her partner as the adoptive
parents). 3 Nonetheless, the Fourth District Court of Appeals applied a literal
reading to the adoption statutes, ignoring the interpretation accepted by the
superior courts and the procedures adopted by DSS, and held that second-
parent adoptions have no statutory basis." As DSS is in the business of de-
ciding where to place children, a fact the court conceded,45 it seems ironic
that the court would dismiss the judgment of professionals and refuse to em-
ploy a liberal interpretation of the adoption statues such that DSS's judgment
could continue to be realized.46
The court reasoned that to liberally construe these statutes would exceed
the scope of its authority and usurp the authority of the Legislature. 7 The
court must passively apply the Legislature's intent as reflected in the words
of the statute.48 Therefore "in accordance with the clear and unambiguous
39. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112. See infra Part III for a further discussion of statu-
tory construction.
40. This includes biological children (either through artificial insemination or through a
previous relationship) and children from an earlier adoption. The adoption scenario occurs
when one partner legally adopts a child by herself either because that state's laws did not al-
low a gay couple to adopt or because the couple was not in a relationship at the time of the
adoption. Because this article focuses on the Sharon S. case, it will focus primarily on the
situation involving a biological mother.
41. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112.
42. DSS approves or disapproves each adoption on a case-by-case basis. Id.
43. Id. at 113. The court only discussed the former method because that was the method
called into question on appeal. Id. It can be assumed that because the latter method is simi-
larly not statutorily authorized (it is somewhat of a hybrid of agency and independent adop-
tion procedures), the court's holding and rationale would be the same.
44. Id. at 113-14. The court stated it was not bound by the interpretation adopted by su-
perior courts. Id. at 114.
45. The court stated that contrary legislative purposes, as are present here, prevail over
"agency interpretations of statutes within the purview of agency's expertise." Id. at 114.
46. See infra Part IlI for a discussion regarding reasons, other than those stated (supra
note 41), behind the court's refusal to adopt a liberal interpretation.
47. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113-14 (stating that the role of the court is to interpret
and apply the statutes as written, not to re-write them).
48. Id. at 114.
[Vol. 39
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language of the statutes," second-parent adoptions through the use of a
modified independent adoption procedure are not allowed.49
In justifying this holding, the court mentioned that when the Legislature
authorized stepparent adoptions, which allows an adoption by a second par-
ent without termination of the legal parent's rights, it did not similarly au-
thorize modified independent adoptions by same-sex parents or co-parents.
In response to the argument that by not explicitly disallowing such adoptions
the Legislature has approved of them, the court stated that the Legislature
does not enact major policy silently.51 To support this contention, the court
discussed the Legislature's rejection of bills that would have allowed sec-
ond-parent adoptions," and then discussed the passage of Assembly Bill 25,
which authorized registered domestic partners to adopt the child(ren) of their
domestic partners. 3 The court interpreted this action as reflecting the Legis-
lature's past disapproval of modified independent adoptions, suggesting that
the Legislature only now approved of such adoptions.4 This rationale is
flawed, however, because Assembly Bill 25 applies to the stepparent adop-
tion procedure, not the independent adoption procedure." This suggests that
the Legislature approved of the long-standing modified independent adop-
tion procedure and merely wanted to create a similar procedure for same sex
couples in the stepparent adoption realm. 6 The court, however, refused to
contemplate this option and remained firm in its stance against any other in-
terpretations. 7
Presiding Justice Kremer dissented, agreeing with the position taken by
Annette, and several amici including Children of Lesbians and Gays Every-
where (COLAGE), Family Pride Coalition, the National Center for Youth
Law and Legal Services for Children, the American Civil Liberties Unions
of San Diego and Southern California (ACLU), and the Lambda Legal De-
fense and Education Fund (Lambda Legal). Justice Kremer relied on the
1925 case of Marshall v. Marshall,8 despite the majority's attempt to distin-
guish it." In Marshall, a widowed mother of two minor children married her
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994)).
52. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115 (citing Assemb. B. 53, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. §§
1,2).
53. Id. at 115 (citing Assemb. B. 25, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal. 2002)).
54. Id.
55. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(f) is amended to read "For the purposes of this chapter,
stepparent adoption includes adoption by a domestic partner, as defined in Section 297." As-
semb. B. 25, 2001-2002 Sess. § 5 (Cal. 2002) (emphasis added).
56. See discussion infra Part V for details on Assemb. B. 25, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal.
2002).
57. The court neglected to address the issue of de facto parenthood in this context. See
infra Part III for a discussion on this possibility as well as a discussion on parenthood by equi-
table estoppel.
58. 239 P. 36 (Cal. 1925).
59. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
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second husband.' The children's new stepfather adopted them pursuant to
former Civil Code sections 221 to 229.61 Eventually, however, the couple di-
vorced and the husband agreed to surrender his adoption of the children to
allow for the readoption of the children by the wife.62 Four days after the
wife completed the adoption of her children, the court rendered an interlocu-
tory divorce decree (finalized soon thereafter) awarding custody of the chil-
dren to the wife and ordering the husband to pay her child support alimony
(which had been previously agreed to by the parties in a separate agree-
ment).63 After several years of paying his child support alimony obligations,
the husband moved to modify the decrees to eliminate the provision stating
there were children of the marriage.' The superior court agreed with the
husband that there were no children of the marriage and thus he did not owe
child support alimony.65
The California Supreme Court found the superior court's decision erro-
neous.6 Of particular relevance, the court commented on the principle of re-
adoption, noting the absurdity of a natural and legal mother having to re-
adopt her children in order to obtain custody during divorce simply because
her new husband had adopted them at one point.67 In order for this to be ap-
propriate, the court stated, the adoption by her husband would had to have
severed her parental relationship with her children.68 Despite the clear and
unambiguous statutory language of former Civil Code section 229,69 the
court refused to accept the thought that a mother's rights as a parent could be
severed when her husband adopted her children because this was not the in-
tent of the parties.7" The court found support for its deviation from the text of
the statute in In re Estate of Williams," where the court acknowledged the
absence of express authority and nevertheless allowed a couple to jointly
adopt a child because it was the "obvious purpose and intent of both of the
parties" to do so. 72
Justice Kremer took exception to the majority's strict construction of the
relevant adoption statutes. As he stated, "California adoption laws are to be
60. Id. (citing Marshall, 239 P. at 36).
61. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116 (citing Marshall, 239 P. at 36).
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Marshall, 239 P. at 37).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 116-17 (citing Marshall, 239 P. at 38).
69. The text stated: "The parents of an adopted child are, from the time of adoption, re-
lieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for, the child so adopted, and have
no right over it." Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117; Marshall, 239 P. at 38.
70. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117.
71. 36P. 407 (Cal. 1894).
72. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117; Marshall, 239 P. at 38.
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construed liberally to protect the welfare of the children."73 Even though the
Civil Code adoption statutes in Marshall did not expressly allow stepparent
adoptions, the Supreme Court liberally construed the statutes to allow such
adoptions so as to harmonize with the intent of the parties.7" Similarly here,
although the statutes may not expressly authorize second-parent adoptions,
the statutes must be liberally construed to effectuate the intentions of Sharon
and Annette." Proof of these intentions was found in the independent adop-
tion placement agreement and the attached addendum, which together pro-
vided that Annette would acquire legal rights to Joshua without Sharon los-
ing hers. 6 Following Marshall, Justice Kremer concluded, second-parent
adoptions are viable and are not prohibited by the adoption statutes.77
The amicus brief of COLAGE, Family Pride Coalition, ACLU of San
Diego, ACLU of Southern California, Lambda Legal, and National Center
for Lesbian Rights took a consonant position to that of Justice Kremer."8 The
brief focused on the legal question of statutory construction, stressing that
"[t]his state's adoption law always must be interpreted liberally and consis-
tently with its policy goal of securing legal and emotional relationships be-
tween children and adults who raise them.' ' 9 California, too, has benefited
from the successful execution of second-parent adoptions because those
children now have stable two-parent homes."0
The argument of the amicus brief began by acknowledging that superior
courts across California for approximately fifteen years have interpreted the
adoption statutes to permit second-parent adoptions."' To strictly construe
these statutes, it continued, would sever child-parent bonds that the children
73. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117 (citing Dep't of Soc. Welfare v. Superior Court of
Contra Costa County, 459 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1969)); see infra Part III for further discussion on
statutory interpretation.
74. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
75. Id. at 118.
76. Id. at 119.
77. Id.
78. For a description of these organizations see Brief of Amici Curiae Children of Lesbi-
ans and Gays Everywhere, Family Pride, et al. at 16-18, Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San
Diego County, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Ct. App. 2001) (No. DO 37871).
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. Although the brief does not discuss how the state benefits exactly, it can be as-
sumed that the reference was towards the numerous children in foster care who are adopted
by one parent and then subsequently adopted by that parent's partner. The state benefits be-
cause gay couples are often willing to take children others are not, namely those children with
the greatest needs. Kristen Kreishner, Gay Adoption, CHILDREN'S VOICE, Jan. 2002, at 3. Ac-
cording to the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System, in September of
1999, there were 127,000 children in the public welfare system hoping to be adopted. Kristen
Kreishner, Gay Adoption, CHILDREN'S VOICE, Jan. 2002, at 1. Needless to say, when people
take these children out of the public welfare system, the financial responsibility for them is
taken from the state.
81. Brief of Arnici Curiae Children of Lesbians and Gays Everywhere, supra note 78, at
9
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depend upon and that the parties (originally) intended to remain intact.82 Af-
ter analogizing Marshall to the Sharon S. case, the brief listed all the states
that have allowed second-parent adoptions, 3 indicating broad recognition
that second-parent adoptions are in the best interests of the child.8" The brief
concluded with a request that the court continue to permit second-parent
adoptions in California."
The Court of Appeal in the Sharon S. case chose not to liberally con-
strue the adoption statutes, such that Joshua would be stripped of one of his
parents. This case demonstrates that legal decisions are based often, not on
precedent, but on personal morality and religious beliefs.
III. THE RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE ON CONSTRUCTION OF ADOPTION STATUTES
Despite the request of the amici curiae, the Court of Appeals determined
that a strict construction of the statutes was necessary and ruled second-
parent adoptions impermissible. The court simply dismissed precedent,
which held that adoption statutes are to be liberally construed.86 The explana-
tion offered in this Comment as to why the court turned away from the es-
tablished rule requires a look inside the minds of the judges. As people with
morals, judges and justices unconsciously (and sometimes consciously) im-
pose their values in their judgments.87 This country was founded on a spe-
cific set of Judeo-Christian88 beliefs and many Americans," including most
judges, continue to believe in them today. These judges often rule in cases
according to how they feel best resonates with those Judeo-Christian be-
liefs." Second-parent adoptions do not harmonize with those beliefs because
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id. at 9. Indeed, the National Adoption Information Clearinghouse stated that several
courts have begun to rule that qualifications such as being married and/or heterosexual do not
take priority over the child's best interests. State laws regarding adoptions by gay and lesbian
parents: Second-parent adoptions, at http://adoption.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.
htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.calib.com%2Fnaic%2Fpubs%2Flsame.htm (last updated
Aug. 2, 2000).
85. Brief of Arnici Curiae Children of Lesbians and Gays Everywhere, supra note 78, at
15.
86. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Part IV.
88. This term will be used to refer to the Jewish and Protestant religions as they are
commonly understood in America today. For an analysis of the Judeo-Christian tradition, see
Wilfred M. McClay, The Judeo-Christian Tradition and the Liberal Tradition in the Ameri-
can Republic, in PUBLIC MORALITY, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND THE PROBLEM OF MODERN
LIBERALISM 124-36 (T. William Boxx & Gary M. Quinlivan eds., 2000).
89. This is not to ignore the diverse religious background of Americans. However, be-
cause Judeo-Christianity remains the dominant religion in the United States, and especially
with regards to judges and justices, this Comment focuses on Judeo-Christianity.
90. See infra Part IV.
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this method of adoption is used most often by homosexual couples and ho-
mosexuality is condemned by Judeo-Christianity. 9'
A. Construction of Adoption Statutes
Dating back to 1960, the California Supreme Court prescribed the gen-
eral rule regarding adoption statutes; it required that adoption statute provi-
sions be "liberally construed with a view to effect [sic] its objects and to
promote justice."92 Since 1960, California appellate courts, as well as the
California Supreme Court followed this rule,93 determining that the purpose
of adoption statutes is "the promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of the
benefits of the home and care of their real parents, by the legal recognition
and regulation of the consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart of
the relationship of parent and child."94
In In re Adoption of Barnett,5 the biological mother gave her child up
for adoption to Mr. and Mrs. Davey.96 Before the completion of the adoption,
the Daveys divorced and Mrs. Davey continued to raise the child by her-
self.97 Mrs. Davey notified the natural mother that only she would be adopt-
ing the child and, although the biological mother at that time stated she
would not withdraw her consent, she eventually did just that.98 This pre-
sented Mrs. Davey with a problem because former Civil Code section 226
required the natural mother to give her consent, again, but this time only to
Mrs. Davey instead of to her and her husband.99 The California Supreme
Court refused to mechanically apply the statutory requirements because it
would be unjust and unreasonable."° It continued by noting that the natural
mother consented to the adoption, albeit by more relaxed standards than
those required in the statute, such that Mrs. Davey's adoption should stand."'
In order to "preserve the integrity of the family," the court decided that, "as
between the welfare of the child and the mechanical requirement. . ., the wel-
fare of the child should prevail."'' 2
The California Supreme Court heard a similar case in 1969 where adop-
tive parents divorced and one parent wanted to keep the child whereas the
91. See infra Part III.B.1.
92. In re Adoption of Barnett, 354 P.2d 18, 22 (Cal. 1960).
93. See, e.g. , Dep't of Soc. Welfare v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 459 P.2d
897 (Cal. 1969); Barnett, 354 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1960); In re Adoption of Backhaus, 25 Cal. Rptr.
581 (Ct. App. 1962).
94. Backhaus, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
95. 354 P.2d 18.
96. Id. at 19-20.
97. Id. at 20.
98. Id. at 20-21.
99. Id. at 22.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id.
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other did not.' 3 Again, the court decided to excise the part of the relevant
adoption statute that would not facilitate the adoption."l Under the holdings
of the court in these cases, it would seem as though the court in Sharon S.
should have allowed Annette to adopt Joshua because this was the intent of
Sharon and Annette, and because this would have preserved the family unit
and ensured Joshua's welfare. Furthermore, under Adoption of Backhaus,5
the court in Sharon S. should not have limited the meaning of the statute be-
cause no express declaration prohibiting second-parent adoptions existed."6
In second-parent adoptions, the child already has a legal relationship
with one parent and thus the purpose of the adoption statutes, as enunciated
in Backhaus,'0' must be grafted for this situation to mean that children de-
serve the legal recognition of two parents. Indeed, the American Academy of
Pediatrics supports second-parent adoptions because they offer an opportu-
nity for children "to know that their relationships with both of their parents
are stable and legally recognized."'0 8 Nonetheless, in the context of second-
parent adoptions, or of gay parent custody issues in general, courts have re-
fused to liberally construe the statutes to comport with this purpose.
A 1991 First District Court of Appeals case illustrates; Nancy S. v.
Michele G."'° reads almost identically to Sharon S. Two women lived to-
gether for eleven years and then decided to have a baby." After Nancy be-
came pregnant through artificial insemination and had their first child, the
couple wanted to have another child."' Nancy again was artificially insemi-
nated and gave birth to their second child."' The children called both women
"Mom."" 3 The couple eventually broke up, and after several custody dis-
putes, the biological mother moved for sole legal and physical custody alleg-
ing that Michele had no legal rights as a parent."' The court, noting that
Michele qualified as a "de facto" parent and conceding that the children
would suffer from this result, strictly interpreted the statute such that Mich-
ele had no parental rights."5
103. Contra Costa County, 459 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1969).
104. Id. at 900.
105. See supra notes 93 and 94 and accompanying text.
106. Backhaus, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 585 (stating "[tihe courts of this state have evinced a
concern to further the spirit and purpose of adoption and have been loath to place a restriction
or limitation upon the meaning of the Legislature which the statutory language will not sup-
port").
107. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
108. Coimnittee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, Coparent or Sec-
ond-Parent Adoptions by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 3, 339-40 (Feb. 2002), at
http://www.aap.org/policy/020008.htm.
109. 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991).
110. Id. at214.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 219.
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The courts in Nancy S. and Sharon S. failed to respect the long-
established principle that "[t]he literal meaning of the words of a statute may
be disregarded to avoid absurd results,""' 6 arguably because it would have
resulted in two lesbian parents raising a child. It seems absurd that one par-
ent, with the help of the court, can deny the other parent rights to custody,
visitation, or adoption of the child she has raised since birth, simply because
the former parent chose to give birth to the baby or signed on the dotted line
at the adoption agency first. There is, however, a logical explanation: repug-
nance towards homosexuals, which originated with this country's adoption
of the Judeo-Christian religion.
B. The Religious Influence
Robert N. Bellah, a well-known religious scholar, asserted in several es-
says that America was modeled on the Protestant church."7 Although Amer-
ica may not have explicitly implemented the Protestant religion, he argued,
"the Protestant Reformation was the single most significant archetype under-
lying American self-understanding.""' He also noted that "[o]ur culture has
always been Protestant to the bone and still is," accounting for the "Judeo"
part of "Judeo-Christianity" by stating that Catholics and Jews have been
"Protestantized" for a long time."9
Numerous other scholars have agreed with Bellah on this issue. For in-
stance, one collection of essays begins by declaring that the Judeo-Christian
tradition "contributed profoundly to the moral character and vitality of
American society and, indeed, played no inconsiderable role in shaping the
political life of the developing country."'' 0 Justice John T. Noonan, Jr. has
argued that, despite the Supreme Court's attempts to ignore the country's
obvious approval of the Judeo-Christian (mostly Christian) religion, 2' Amer-
ica overtly condones the practices and beliefs of Christianity.' To support
this contention, Noonan points to the national holidays of Christmas and
Thanksgiving, to the prayer conducted at the opening of a court, and to the
phrase "In God We Trust" imprinted on the coinage.'23
116. Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 245, n.7 (Cal. 1991) (quoting
Silver v. Brown, 409 P.2d 689, 692 (Cal. 1966)).
117. See sources cited supra note 5.
118. Robert N. Bellah, Epilogue, in MEANING AND MODERNITY: RELIGION, POLITY AND
SELF 255, 260 (Richard Madsen et al. eds., 1970).
119. Id. at 267.
120. PUBLIC MORALITY, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND THE PROBLEM OF MODERN LIBERALISM, at xi
(T. William Boxx & Gary M. Quinlivan eds., 2000).
121. Noonan refers to a situation where the Supreme Court considered Christmas to have
a secular purpose. NOONAN, supra note 5, at 230.
122. Id. at 230-31, 245.
123. Id.
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C. The Origin of the Animus Towards Homosexuals
Both the Bible and the Torah condemn homosexuality. The oft-quoted
passage shared by the Bible and the Torah states "thou shall not lie with
mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination. '24 Elsewhere in the book of
Leviticus, ironically best known for the passage "[1]ove your neighbor as
you love yourself,"'' the author calls homosexual relations disgusting and
worthy of death. 6 Apostle Paul includes "homosexual perverts" in his list of
sinners that also contains those who are immoral, adulterers, and drunk-
ards. 7 Several authors of books of the Bible refer to the story of Sodom and
Gomorrah, where God condemned men in the city who raped other men.'
Orthodox Jews consider homosexuality unnatural and a sickness. 9 It is seen
to undermine the mitzvah of procreation and to destroy the cherished family
structure.
30
D. The Effect of the Animus in the Legal System
Despite the other viable interpretations of the Bible and the Torah, 3' and
despite the facts indicating that homosexuality does not destroy the Jewish
(or any other) family life,' homosexuality is still considered immoral,
124. Leviticus 18:22 (American Standard Version). Other versions state it differently:
"No man is to have sexual relations with another man; God hates that." Leviticus 18:22 (To-
day's English Version).
125. Leviticus 19:18 (Today's English Version).
126. Leviticus 20:13 (Today's English Version).
127. 1 Corinthians 6:9-10 (Today's English Version).
128. Genesis 19:1-29 (Today's English Version).
129. Jonathan J. Oriole, Homosexuality and its role in Judaism, at
http://www.geocities.comwesthollywood/4943/homojew.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
130. Id.
131. For instance, another way to interpret the Sodom and Gomorrah story stresses con-
demnation of xenophobia, lack of hospitality, and violent sexual relations. Rabbi Don Ros-
soff, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, at http://uahc.org/ask/homosexuality.shtml
(last visited Mar. 30, 2002). When the Bible was written, it was not known that homosexual
relations could be consensual and loving. Judaism and Homosexuality, at http://philo.ucdavis.
edu/zope/home/bruce/RST23/STDNTPAGES/michelle.html (last modified Mar. 9, 1997).
Some people have advocated that God approved of homosexual relationships as long as they
were caring. J. Richards, The Love Between David and Jonathan, at http://rainbowalliance
openfaith.homestead.com/GayLove3.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2002) (discussing the rela-
tionship of David and Jonathan introduced in 1 Samuel 18:20 as more than a friendship). It
has also been pointed out that literally abiding by the word of the Bible and Torah would re-
sult in the continuation of sacrificing of animals and Shabbat violators being stoned to death.
Oriole, supra note 129.
132. This can be evidenced by the fact that there are thirty family-oriented gay syna-
gogues in North America (Oriole, supra note 129), as well as by the fact that the Central Con-
ference of American Rabbis, the Federation of Reconstructionist Congregations and Hauvrot,
and the Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association have documented their approval of same-
sex relationships. Marc Wolinsky, Stereotypes, Tolerance and Acceptance: Gay Rights in
Courts of Law and Public Opinion, 19 DEL. LAW. 13, n.57 (Summer 2001).
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wrong, and by some, even contagious.' The following cases illustrate the
influence this belief has on the opinions of the judges and thereby on the ju-
dicial system."'
In 1978, Justice Rehnquist dissented from the decision to deny certiorari
in a case concerning the right of a gay student group to exist on a university
campus. 35 In his dissent, he likened the issue to "whether those suffering
from measles have a constitutional right, in violation of quarantine regula-
tions, to associate together and with others who do not presently have mea-
sles."'36 This comment implies that Justice Rehnquist considered homosexu-
ality to be a disease that can be spread and caught by others who stand too
close. It can be inferred, then, that he would not want two homosexuals to
"get" a straight child "sick" by raising that child together.
Another case, Bowers v. Hardwick,'37 stands for the proposition that
homosexuals do not have a fundamental right to engage in sexual relations.'38
In justifying its decision, the Supreme Court relied heavily on religious be-
liefs. Justice Burger, in his concurrence, supported the decision because
"proscriptions against sodomy have very 'ancient roots.' ... Condemnation
of [homosexual conduct] is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and
ethical standards."' 39 Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Justice Bren-
nan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens, acknowledged the Court's reli-
gious undertones disapproving of homosexual conduct by stating that, before
the Court can decide to take away a man's right to privacy, it must "do more
than assert that the choice [homosexuals] have made is an 'abominable
crime not fit to be named among Christians.""' He continued with the asser-
tion that "traditional Judeo-Christian values ... cannot provide an adequate
justification for" the law against homosexual sex.'' Despite his plea, the
Court ruled in favor of established theonomy against homosexual conduct.
133. "Contagious" may be hyperbole, but it epitomizes the navete of people like Dr.
Norman Geisler and Frank Turek who write that "heterosexuals reproduce, but homosexuals
can only recruit." DR. NORMAN GEISLER & FRANK TUREK, LEGISLATING MORALITY: IS IT
WISE? IS IT LEGAL? IS IT POSSIBLE? 138 (1998).
134. "A government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal
when it asserts that God prefers some." Matthew A. Ritter, Constitutional Jurisprudence of
Law and Religion, 40 CAT. LAW. 323, n.23 (2001) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
591-92 (1992) (Blackmun, J. concurring)).
135. See Univ. of Missouri v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
136. Wolinsky, supra note 132, at 14-15 (quoting Univ. of Missouri v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S.
1080, 1082, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting)).
137. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
138. Id. at 197.
139. Marc L. Rubinstein, Gay Rights and Religion: A Doctrinal Approach to the Argu-
ment that Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives Violate the Establishment Clause, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1585, 1592 (1995) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J. concurring)).
See also supra Part III.B.
140. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-200.
141. Id. at211.
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Justice Scalia similarly expressed his thoughts supporting morality leg-
islation (against homosexuality) in his dissent from the Romer v. Evans deci-
sion.42 The majority did not even decide whether homosexuality should be
considered a suspect classification for equal protection analysis purposes,
but the prospect of getting near to that decision scared Scalia. He argued that
Colorado's Amendment 2 (essentially discriminating against homosexuals)
effectively "preserved traditional sexual mores," as the legislation was meant
to do.'43 His position promotes the enactment of laws based on "hostility and
moral disapproval."1 An Oscar Wilde quote seems appropriate: "Morality is
simply the attitude we adopt toward the people we personally dislike." '45
Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida are just a
few of the states that have ignored studies regarding the best interests of
children in a homosexual family'. and have injected moral views into their
laws to prohibit homosexual parenting (to the extent legally possible).'' A
dramatic example of such a situation in Mississippi is Weigand v. Hough-
ton.4 Soon after Mom and Dad had a son together, they divorced.' Mom
got remarried to Son's stepfather, an unemployed convicted felon, who
physically abused his wife, drank too much, and cheated on his wife. 5° Dad
moved to California, bought a home, and settled into a healthy, long-term
relationship.' Mom worked two jobs and left Son at home with her second
abusive husband since divorcing Dad.'52 Dad remodeled a room in his house
for Son, investigated private schools for Son to attend, and sought informa-
142.' 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting). See infra Part IV for a further discussion
of his dissent.
143. S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and the Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39 ARIZ.
L. REv. 1259, 1265-68 (Winter 1997) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
144. Strong, supra note 143, at 1267.
145. Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND. L. J. 331,
404 (Spring 1995) (quoting Oscar Wilde, An Ideal Husband, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
OSCAR WILDE 173 (R. Fraser ed., 1969)).
146. See Wolinsky, supra note 132, at n.36 (quoting a 1995 American Psychological As-
sociation paper stating that "not a single study has found children of gay and lesbian parents
to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to children of heterosexual parents");
Kreishner, supra note 80, at 4 (explaining a study completed by University of Southern Cali-
fornia researchers that found that children of gay parents exhibit no differences in child out-
comes when compared to children of heterosexual parents, no higher tendency to identify
themselves as gay than children of heterosexual parents, and a higher level of affection, re-
sponsiveness and psychological strength than children of heterosexual parents); Committee on
Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, supra note 108 (reporting on the American
Academy of Pediatrics' approval of second-parent adoptions as in the best interest of the chil-
dren because it guarantees rights and protections not otherwise given to homosexual families).
147. Wolinsky, supra note 132, at 19.
148. 730 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1999) (McRae, J. dissenting).
149. Id. at 583.
150. Id. at 584-85, 588.
151. Id. at 583-84.
152. Id. at 585.
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tion concerning publication of Son's short stories.'5 3 After Dad discovered
that Son had been witnessing stepfather's abusive attacks on Mom, he
moved for custody of Son.54 Son did not express any preference regarding
which parent to live with,"' and the court subsequently held that it would be
in the child's best interest to remain with Mom.'56
As the dissenting opinion, written by Justice McRae astutely recog-
nized, the "majority [is] blinded by the fact that [son's] father is gay.""'5 Jus-
tice McRae stressed that in no way did the majority base its opinion on the
best interests of the child, but instead based the decision on its perceptions of
morality as it relates to sexual orientation."8 The majority ignored the inevi-
table psychological damage living in an abusive home would have on Son
and instead focused on "condemning"'59 Dad's lifestyle."w Justice McRae
noted that the majority likely was most appalled by Dad's openness towards
his homosexuality and thus resolved the custody issue against him. 6'
In Florida, the legislature and the courts are more blatant with their
negative views on homosexuality. Florida continues to ban lesbians and gays
from adopting.6 This law has gotten a lot of media coverage since Rosie
O'Donnell wanted to adopt in Florida but could not due to her sexuality.
Currently, she is advocating for the removal of this law because of its prohi-
bition on one particular gay couple from adopting a foster child whom they
have raised since he was a little boy.'63
Precedent demonstrates that adoption statutes are liberally construed,
except, however, in the context of homosexual parents. Although the ration-
ale given by the courts frequently stems from the best interests of the child
standard, reality dictates that those on the bench often subscribe to the
Judeo-Christian belief that homosexuals are immoral, and subsequently in-
corporate this belief into their decisions.
IV. THE ENDORSEMENT OF JUDEO-CHRISTIAN BELIEFS
It is difficult to find another explanation for denying homosexual par-
ents the same rights as heterosexual parents besides the one professed by this
Comment: courts continue to abide by the archaic notions of right and
wrong, erroneously based on religious ideology. Courts have gone so far as
153. Id. at 584.
154. Id. at 584-85.
155. Id. at 584.
156. Id. at 587-88.
157. Id. at 588.
158. Id.
159. Note the religious rhetoric, no doubt a purposeful use of the word.
160. Weigand, 730 So. 2d at 588.
161. Id. at 590-91.
162. Ryan Lilith, The G.LF.T. of Two Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 207,213 (Spring 2001).
163. Prime Time (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 14, 2002).
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to avoid the de facto parent and parent by estoppel arguments raised by sec-
ond-parents in adoption and custody cases presumably because they are
aware that this would require them to find a compelling interest before inter-
fering with these parents' rights to care, custody, and control of their chil-
dren.' It would be difficult to discover a compelling interest because the
motivation behind these laws turns on the judges' personal morals, which are
founded in religion, and using religion as a compelling governmental interest
violates the First Amendment.
A. The Connection Between Morality Legislation and Religion
Morality legislation refers to the "category of laws regulating conduct
that violates established social norms but poses no concrete or tangible harm
to persons other than the actor, and possibly not even to him or herself."'65
Although some people contend that homosexuality in general, and second-
parent adoptions specifically, harms others, numerous studies have demon-
strated that no such harm exists.'66 Nonetheless, because both situations con-
travene traditional American mores, legal decision-makers continue to target
them. "It would be foolish to dispute that morality enters into the decision-
making processes of political policy makers."'67
164. The court in Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Ct. App. 2001) did not discuss the
issue of Annette as a de facto parent or parenthood by estoppel. The court in Nancy S., 279
Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991) did discuss the issue and decided that the legal mother's for-
mer partner "may" be a de facto parent to their child but nonetheless denied the partner rights
to custody. Cf In re Guardianship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 50-51 (Ct. App. 1999)
(court held that a legal mother's former partner did not have standing to ask for guardianship
of their child and could not be considered a de facto parent because that designation is only
allowed in juvenile dependency proceedings). According to the American Law Institute's
Principles of Law of Family Dissolution, however, the former partner of a legal mother would
qualify at least as a de facto parent, if not as parents by estoppel, a more stringent standard.
Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders: What the American Law Institute has done for Gay
and Lesbian Families, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 87, 96-97 (2001). Under intestacy laws,
these women (or at least Annette) would be considered parents as well. See CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6454 (West 2000) (requiring the relationship between parent and child to have begun during
the child's minority and clear and convincing evidence that the parent would have adopted but
for a legal barrier). Therefore, according to the United States Supreme Court, the state needs a
compelling interest to interfere with parents' fundamental right to make decisions regarding
the care, custody, and control of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 72-76
(2000).
165. Strong, supra note 143, at n.8.
166. Dr. Geisler and Frank Turek argue that homosexuals die earlier simply by virtue of
being gay. GEISLER & TUREK, supra note 133, at 129-52. They state that "[n]ature seems to
reward with good health and long life those who practice traditional morality." Id. at 133.
They believe the legalization of homosexual marriages would encourage children to be gay.
Id. at 138. No doubt they would similarly disapprove of second-parent adoptions because of
the "unhealthy example" it sets for the children. Id. The statistics do not support this conten-
tion. See supra note 146.
167. Gey, supra note 145, at 331.
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Arguably the most famous decision where morality dominated the deci-
sion is Bowers v. Hardwick.6' In coming to the conclusion that homosexual
sodomy is not a fundamental right, the court acknowledged that the "law...
is constantly based on notions of morality," and it refused to invalidate anti-
sodomy laws based on its sentiments about the morality of homosexuality.9
As the dissent discussed, this decision was filled with religious undertones. 7 '
A more recent, and more blatant, approval of morality legislation is Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans.7' He expressed his disappointment
in the majority's opinion (outlawing a Colorado discriminatory amendment)
by writing a seventeen-page dissent, concentrating primarily on the duty of
decision-makers to legislate morality.' He claimed the purpose of the law is
to shape public morality.' This premise rested on the idea that "if legislation
is unable to preserve or protect societal mores, then the law loses its claim to
legitimacy."'74 After putting the pieces together, Scalia's argument essen-
tially advocated for the implementation of anti-homosexual beliefs through
laws. '7
Although Scalia did not explicitly justify his theory on religious
grounds, theonomy no doubt played a role. As George Washington recog-
nized during his presidential farewell address, "[b]oth reason and experience
forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of reli-
gious principle."'76 Indeed, at one time it was thought that the sin of immor-
ality endangered the chances for religious salvation. "7 The state, however, no
longer has an obligation "to save its citizens' souls," and therefore should
remain out of the business of doing so through legislation or otherwise.'
168. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
169. Id. at 196. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992), the Court conceded that it should not mandate its own moral code, despite the
pressures to do so. Id. at 958. This Comment questions whether the Court has been able (or
wants) to overcome the intense pressure. Justice Scalia made it clear in his dissent in Romer
that he had no intentions of leaving his morals out of legislation. Dr. Geisler and Frank Turek
agree that if government does not legislate morality, "evil will prevail." GEISLER & TUREK,
supra note 133, at 142.
170. Id. at 210; see supra Part III.B.
171. 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting). See supra Part III.B. For an in
depth analysis of Justice Scalia's dissent, see Strong, supra note 143.
172. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996); see also Strong, supra note 143.
173. Strong, supra note 143, at 1267.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1280.
176. DAVID G. MYERS, THE AMERICAN PARADOX: SPIRITUAL HUNGER IN AN AGE OF
PLENTY 268 (2000). President Washington introduced a syllogism that solidified this idea:
"Morality is necessary for the existence of republican government. Religion is necessary for
morality. Therefore, religion is necessary for the continued existence of the republic."
NOONAN, supra note 5, at 114.
177. Strong, supra note 143, at 1286-87.
178. Id. at 1289. See discussion infra Part IV.B. regarding ways to avoid the seemingly
inevitable commingling.
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Granted, this separation will be quite difficult because religion and mo-
rality are so intertwined. Furthermore, legal decision-makers (i.e., legislators
and judges) are both government officials with responsibilities and human
beings with consciences."' It is easy to see how their personal theological in-
terpretation could get confused with their governmental tasks, such as statu-
tory interpretation. 8 Herein lies the problem with the Sharon S. decision.
B. An Establishment of a Religion Clause Challenge
An establishment of religion violation by the judicial system seems
more apparent after this robust connection between morality legislation and
religion is drawn. 8' Although people may not think of themselves as reli-
gious per se, they continue to abide by the basic tenets of the dominant relig-
ions, mostly Judeo-Christianity.'82 Within these tenets remains the fear and
animosity towards homosexuals.'83 Courts, as a result, strictly construe stat-
utes because it resonates with the moral principles of the judges, and there-
fore resonates with the religious tenets of Judeo-Christianity.
In enacting and regulating morality legislation, such as second-parent
adoptions, the courts disintegrate the wall between church and state"' and in
its place construct a bridge between the two. Once church and state become
this enmeshed, the courts become vulnerable to a First Amendment attack.
The Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp.'85 gave a
comprehensive summary of the meaning behind the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, specifically delineating what the government cannot
do without violating the Constitution."16
179. NOONAN, supra note 5, at 246.
180. Id. at 224.
181. See Sherryl E. Michaelson, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of
Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301, 306 (1984) (stating that this connec-
tion "is not difficult to make since most morality legislation is 'a relic in the law of our reli-
gious heritage"').
182. See Ritter, supra note 134, at 142 (2001) (asserting that religion is more a matter of
living properly, namely within the Judeo-Christian heritage, than conforming to express
dogma and ritual). See also Rubinstein, supra note 139, at 1613 (acknowledging that indi-
viduals, contrary to anti-gay-rights initiative sponsors, "may not realize the connection be-
tween popular morality and traditional Christian belief").
183. See discussion supra Part III.
184. Strong, supra note 143, at 1298 (stating that "it seems incongruous to recognize re-
ligious freedom and tout the institutional separation of church and state while still allowing
the state to regulate morality with a free hand). See Ritter, supra note 134, at 103 for a de-
tailed analysis of the erection of the wall between church and state (theorizing that separation
between church and state "covertly valorized a Protestant religiosity" from the origin). See
generally Gey, supra note 145, for church/state discussion and for similarities between estab-
lishment of religion and moral regulation, suggesting constitutional concerns regarding one is
applicable to the other.
185. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
186. Actual text of the relevant portions of the First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbe-
lief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. 87
Under Everson, the courts that condemn homosexuality through the law
are violating the Establishment Clause. As there is no demonstrated reason,
besides a moral (and therefore religious) one, to disallow second-parent
adoptions by strictly construing the statutes, the courts essentially are en-
dorsing the beliefs of Judeo-Christianity. The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peals in Sharon S., for example, preferred the Judeo-Christian belief that
homosexuality is immoral and extended that to mean that lesbians should not
and cannot co-parent. These second-parents, in effect, are being punished for
their disbelief in, at least parts of, the Judeo-Christian religion. "Divine reve-
lation and scripture may be a proper basis for a moral standard, but they
cannot serve as the unexamined basis for discrimination by our govern-
ment." 88
1. Background
The fact that "no court has ruled in favor of a gay rights position on an
Establishment Clause basis"'89 does not take away from the efficacy of the
argument." For instance, it is no secret that the Court in Bowers v. Hard-
wick' decided the case on religious grounds: "[P]roscriptions against sod-
omy have very 'ancient roots.' . . . Condemnation of [homosexual conduct]
is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.' ' 2 Al-
though the current courts hide their disapproval of the homosexual lifestyle
better by avoiding religious language and searching for secular-appearing
justifications, the result is the same. The courts, in wanting to preserve the
status quo with which they are comfortable, in turn establish a religion.'93
187. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (em-
phasis added).
188. Wolinsky, supra note 132, n.20 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Young, Conaway,
Stargatt & Taylor, Steffan v. Perry, Sec'y of Def., 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
See Gey, supra note 145, at 386 (discussing how an establishment of a particular religion by
the government undermines the principle of individual autonomy (to choose and exercise
one's religion) deemed so fundamental in this country).
189. Rubinstein, supra note 139, at 1591.
190. See generally id.
191. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
192. Rubinstein, supra note 139, at 1592 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986)
(Burger, C.J. concurring)). See also supra Part III.B.
193. Rubinstein, supra note 139, at 1609.
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2. Application
To overcome an Establishment Clause challenge, the courts (specifically
the court in Sharon S.) must pass the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.94 This three-prong test requires the court's strict statutory construction
to have (1) a secular legislative purpose, (2) a principal or primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) no "excessive government en-
tanglement with religion.""' Concededly, the court's construction cannot fail
the Lemon test merely because it coincides with the tenets of the Judeo-
Christian religion.'96 According to the Supreme Court's declaration in
McGowan v. Maryland,'97 in order for the court in Sharon S. to have violated
the Establishment Clause, it must have adopted the strict statutory construc-
tion with the purpose of endorsing Judeo-Christian beliefs.' This is exactly
what it did.
Because the courts wisely have eliminated most of the religious rhetoric
from their opinions, it is absent in those opinions regarding second-parent
adoptions; it is difficult, therefore, to show a complete lack of a secular leg-
islative purpose because the language used disguises the religious principles.
The different treatment between heterosexual couples and homosexual cou-
ples in this context, however, impliedly demonstrates the religious motiva-
tion and the religious primary effect.'99 Nothing else accounts for the court's
decision in Sharon S. to suddenly strictly construe adoption statutes after
years of precedent that liberally construed those statutes.2" There is no harm
to the children and in fact it has been reported that a second-parent situation
will foster positive child development."' It follows, then, that because there
is no secular purpose and a primary effect that advances religious beliefs, the
statutory construction fails the Lemon test.2
Michaelson offers another analysis of Establishment Clause viola-
tions."' Under Michaelson's "competing constitutional values model" Estab-
194. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
195. Id. at 612-613.
196. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra Part 11 for a discussion of Marshall and Part III.A. for a discussion of
Barnett and Contra Costa County, three heterosexual cases where the courts liberally con-
strued the relevant adoption statutes. In contrast, the court in Sharon S. (among others) strictly
construed the statutes. See supra Part II for Sharon S. discussion and Part III.A. for other ex-
amples of strict construction in homosexual context.
200. In a similar vein, a gay rights activist fighting against the anti-gay-rights initiatives
in Florida stated: "What these people are doing is to try to codify into law their version of the
Bible." Rubinstein, supra note 139, at n. 114.
201. See supra note 146.
202. The statutory construction similarly fails the third prong of the Lemon test because
by advancing a religious purpose, the courts are excessively entangled with religion.
203. See Michaelson, supra note 181, at 312-14, 388-96, using the example of prohibi-
tions against gay marriages.
[Vol. 39
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 39 [2002], No. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol39/iss1/7
2002] INTERPRETATION OF SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION STATUTES 159
lishment Clause challenges take a two-step approach. "First, the interests
underlying the suspect [statutory construction] must be scrutinized to deter-
mine whether they can be traced to values recognized explicitly or implicitly
in the Constitution.' 24 If the interests do not have roots in the Constitution,
then the statutory construction is unconstitutional per se.25 If the interests
can be traced to the Constitution, then the second step requires a balancing
between the interests advanced by strict construction and the values underly-
ing the Establishment Clause."6
The court in Sharon S. arguably found constitutional interests to satisfy
step one, but it fails again at step two. The interests enumerated by the court
to support the decision of strict construction include: the avoidance of "de-
feat[ing] the overall statutory framework and fundamental rules of statutory
construction,""2 7 the refusal to terminate a legal mother's rights, the discre-
tion of the courts to interpret statutes without deference to DSS, and the right
of the legislature to solve important social problems.0 The problem, how-
ever, is that these constitutionally-recognized interests ignored precedent
demanding liberal construction of adoption statutes, overlooked the clear in-
tent of Sharon to have Annette adopt Joshua, dismissed recommendations by
the Department of Social Services (whose job it is to execute the best inter-
ests of the children), and misinterpreted Assembly Bill 25.209 The connection
between the stated interests and the ultimate decision to proscribe second-
parent adoptions is so attenuated that the interests no longer seem to have
sufficient roots in the Constitution for this purpose. As a result, such a strict
construction of the statutes would be unconstitutional per se.
Supposing the interests maintain a sufficient connection to the Constitu-
tion, the values underlying the Establishment Clause outweigh the interests
stated by the court. The fact that the court strained to find justification for its
decision, coupled with the fact that the efficacy of second-parent adoptions
is heavily debated, "confirms the supposition that the [strict statutory con-
struction was] meant to advance certain conceptions of traditional morality,"
and thus traditional Judeo-Christian beliefs."0 Therefore, the strict statutory
construction by the court in Sharon S. violated the Establishment Clause.'
204. Michaelson, supra note 181, at 314.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
208. Id. at 113-14.
209. Id. at 114-15. See supra Part 11 for a description of these problems.
210. Michaelson, supra note 181, at 394 (concluding her analysis on gay marriage prohi-
bitions).
211. See also Gey, supra note 145, at 391, discussing another two-step analysis for Es-
tablishment Clause challenges: "all government action regulating individual expression or
behavior must have a primarily amoral purpose" and "must have a substantially amoral ef-
fect." Under the same rationale as given above, strict interpretation of second-parent adoption
statutes would fail this test.
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V. ASSEMBLY BILL 25
In 1999, Assembly Bill 26 statutorily recognized domestic partnerships
in California."' Governor Davis vetoed a similar, more inclusive bill (Senate
Bill 75) in the same year because Senate Bill 75 was "overly broad" and be-
cause Assembly Bill 26 would serve the same purposes and had a narrower
scope." To follow up, several Senators and Assembly members introduced
bills to extend rights given to married couples to domestic partners."' These
bills were either made inactive or vetoed." The timing must have been right
for Democratic Assemblywoman Carol Midgen because in 2001 her pro-
posed bill, Assembly Bill 25, passed through both houses. 6
In the context of adoptions, Assembly Bill 25 allows domestic partners
to be treated as stepparents. Specifically, Section 9000 of the California
Family Code reads: "A domestic partner, as defined in Section 297,"7 desir-
ing to adopt a child of his or her domestic partner may for that purpose file a
petition in the county in which the petitioner resides."" 8 The statute contin-
ues by stating that "[f]or the purposes of this chapter, stepparent adoptions
include adoption by a domestic partner, as defined in Section 297."2"9
This bill will make it much easier for second-parents to adopt the chil-
dren of their partners, while in a committed, healthy relationship. The bill
does not, however, account for a variety of other realistic situations that oc-
cur in the course of relationships. The most obvious situation is that of
Sharon and Annette; when a legal parent and the soon-to-be-second-parent
separate before the adoption proceedings are complete, the legal parent can
deny the would-be second-parent any rights to care, custody, and control of
the child.2 Another situation where the would-be second-parent cannot le-
gally adopt the child is where the couple does not qualify as domestic part-
ners under Family Code 297, usually because they have moved out of Cali-
fornia and therefore do not satisfy the residency requirement.2 A third
situation that the legislation does not address focuses on where the child
would live should the legal parent die or become incapacitated before the
212. Background: Hearing on Assemb. B. 25 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. 3, 1999-
2000 Sess. (Cal. 1999) (statement of Martha M. Escutia, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee).
213. Id.
214. id.
215. Id.
216. S. Judiciary Comm., Assemb. B. 25, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal. 2002).
217. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (West 2000) defines domestic partners as "two adults
who have chosen to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of
mutual caring." It goes on to list the requirements that must be met in order to qualify as such.
218. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2000).
219. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(0 (West 2002, pocket part).
220. See, e.g., Martha Matthews & Jordan Budd, Sharon S. v. Superior Court, at
http://www.aclu-sc.org/litigation/gylsbian.shtml#sharonsvsuperiorcourt.
221. See, e.g., What is the Sharon S. decision, at http://www.thla.org/ (last updated Jan.
21, 2002).
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successful completion of the second-parent adoption.222 Because the would-
be second-parent is considered a legal stranger to the child, the child will
most likely be removed from "the only other person that was responsible for
the child's upbringing" and placed in either foster care or the care of other
legal family members.23
Although the legislature seems to be turning in the right direction with
its passage of Assembly Bill 25, questions remain regarding why homosex-
ual parents are not given all of the rights given to heterosexual parents. It
could be that Assembly Bill 25 was a compromise between those endorsing
the Judeo-Christian beliefs and those attempting to deviate from that bad
habit. A more positive response might focus on the fact that this bill is a
stepping-stone for more truly legislation, which will consider the interests of
the child instead of the religious implications.
VI. CONCLUSION
Other states look to California to set the legal trend. 4 Should California
statutorily allow second-parent adoptions, other states likely will follow.
They will recognize the many benefits for the children of having two loving
parents. For example, the children will be entitled to inherit from the second-
parent upon that parent's death, to receive support upon separation, and to be
eligible for insurance coverage under the second-parent's policies during
life.2 Moreover, the children will not be forced to sever all familial ties with
the second-parent and her extended family merely because their parents
separated or because the legal parent died before the second-parent com-
pleted the adoption.226 In the alternative, however, if California chooses to
strictly construe the adoption statutes, contrary to precedent and to the chil-
dren's best interests, then the children will be "denied the affection of a
functional parent who has been with them since birth." '227
It is sobering to think that if Annette were a man, with all other facts
analogous to Annette's scenario, this case would likely not be going to the
California Supreme Court. The Fourth District Court of Appeals probably
would have recognized Sharon's blatant approval of Joshua's second-parent
adoption by her partner and subsequently ordered Sharon to be estopped
from prohibiting the execution of the adoption. Joshua deserves two parents
just as much as his brother does and should not be denied access to one par-
ent simply because Zachary was born first. However, timing is not the issue
here; religious beliefs dictated the court's decision. To be sure, the legaliza-
222. Wolinsky, supra note 132, at 18.
223. Id.
224. What is the Sharon S. decision, at http://www.thla.org/ (last updated Jan. 21, 2002).
225. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Mass. 1993); Lilith, supra note 162, at
224-25.
226. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 320; Lilith, supra note 162, at 224-25.
227. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 214-15.
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tion of second-parent adoptions is a moral issue. Moral issues, especially of
this type, invariably have their roots in Judeo-Christianity. Thus, the court's
denial of Annette's rights to adopt Joshua endorsed Judeo-Christian beliefs
and violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Assembly Bill 25 provides some hope. Nonetheless, religious influences
still exist. The bill was opposed by several religiously affiliated groups such
as the Traditional Values Coalition and the Committee on Moral Concerns.229
Both the California Public Policy Foundation and the Mountain Park Baptist
Church wrote letters opposing the bill on the grounds that allowing second-
parent adoptions undermines the traditional (no doubt, religiously-defined
heterosexual) institution of family.229 This thought seems backwards, how-
ever, because not allowing second-parent adoptions deprives children of a
stable, two-parent family. Besides, "love makes a family-nothing more,
nothing less."23
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